
Weighing Context and Trade-offs: How Suburban Adults Selected Their Online Security Posture

Scott Ruoti^{*†}, Tyler Monson^{*}, Justin Wu^{*}, Daniel Zappala^{*}, Kent Seamons^{*} Brigham Young University^{*} Sandia National Laboratories[†]

Motivation

- Prior work on secure email
 - Succeeded in making it usable
 - People were interested, but unsure when they would use it

Step back and understand users better



User Process

Encryption and TLS indicators

Wrap-Up


Participants


- Distinct demographic
 - Suburban
 - Middle-aged
 - Parents
- Compensated \$25 USD
 - 15-45 minute session



Semi-Structured Interviews

- 1. Computer usage
- 2. Threats and coping strategies
- 3. Encryption
- 4. Security notifications
- 5. TLS browser indicators and warnings
- 6. Any remaining thoughts





- Transcribed interviews
- Grounded Theory
 - Open coding (2,442 codes)
 - Axial coding (503 concepts)
 - Selective coding (9 categories)
 - Theory generation (1 process)
- Data available to the community




User Process

Encryption and TLS indicators


Wrap-Up

User Process




Context: The Internet is Transformational

- Improved quality of life
 - "[The Internet] made our whole home schooling process possible.... I mean our lifestyle would not have been possible before the Internet."
- Worked its way into all aspects of our life



Context: Nothing is 100% Safe



- Anything can be broken with enough effort
 - Movies, news reports, relation to the physical world
- Focus on deterrence
 - [If] you throw enough stumbling blocks in [an attacker's] way, they're gonna look for somebody else that's easier to [compromise].

Process: Learning about Threats



- Mostly from media
 - News reports
 - TV dramas
 - Movies
 - Advertisements
- Acquaintances provide clarification
- Reliance on spouse


Process: Evaluate Risk


- Threat don't imply risk
 - 1 in a million
 - Not foolproof
- Key risks
 - Malware, phishing attacks, inappropriate content
 - Permanence, surveillance

[...] there is some concern with kids using Facebook and having a personality develop online....we were able to grow and mature and change, and leave behind our old selves at some point.

[...]You'd feel more free to develop in that way if you knew that they weren't going to be a permanent part of your record to everybody for now and ever.

Process: Estimate Impact






Process: Select Coping Strategies

- Extremes
 - Implement no coping strategies
 - Refuse to bank online
- Most users fall in the middle

- Strong focus on personal vigilance
 - Necessary to teach this to children
- Work with trustworthy companies
- If all else fails, **choose** not to worry




User Process



Encryption and TLS indicators

Wrap-Up

Encryption




- Two-thirds understand that it protects data from unauthorized parties
- One-half understood the need for a secret key

- Nothing being 100% safe
 - Encryption slows down attackers
 - Determined attackers can still break it
 - Requires supercomputers

Browser-Based TLS Security Indicators

- Confused about meaning
 - Site safety vs. connection security
 - Website authentication

- Can lead to unsafe behavior
 - Overtrust in site
 - Ignoring warnings for large, well-established sites



User Process

Encryption and TLS indicators



Wrap-Up

Related Work

- Extended Parallel Process Model
- So Long, and No Thanks for the Externalities, Herley '09
- And many more...

Future Work

- Low cost, high impact recommendations
- Educating users through media
 - YouTube
 - Whiteboard-style presentations
- Privacy-preserving systems for children
- Browser indicators

Thank You

- Data available online
 - http://soups2017.isrl.byu.edu
 - Full study guide
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